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ABSTRACT 
This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues 
that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of 
rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the 
selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral 
sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the 
stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of 
self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it 
protects the agent’s self by undermining the authority she has on her 
mental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation and 
estrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality. 
The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that are 
lower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on her 
agency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend a 
Kantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, and 
argue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agential 
autonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of self-
government.  
1. Introduction 
There is empirical evidence that self-deception is a quite pervasive 
phenomenon, even though some would prefer to believe that it is not. Here is 
an example. Amy knows that her teenager daughter Bea is visibly too thin, does 
not eat properly, is always concerned with her weight, and selects obsessively 
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her food; but Amy does not believe that Bea is anorexic. The evidence is 
accessible and available to her but does not count as a reason for believing that 
her daughter is anorexic. In fact, she avoids discussing and investigating Bea’s 
eating habits, and other related matters. What does prevent Amy from 
acquiring the belief that Bea is anorexic? Is Amy irrational, and in what sense? 
Does her epistemic state bear moral implications, and if so which ones? 
Philosophers have given rather different answers to these questions. As a 
preliminary step, I take self-deception to be the acquisition and retention of a 
belief despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. On some views, self-
deception is the case where one holds a false belief p, possesses evidence that 
~p, and has some desire or emotion that favor p. Intentionalists take self-
deception to result from an intention to deceive (Davidson, 1986; Bermudez 
2000). Instead, Motivationalists hold that the deception depends on some 
interfering motivational state, typically a desire or an emotion (Mele 2001; 
Funkhouser 2003). The self-deceptive agent discounts evidence which one 
normally would find sufficient to warrant ~p, and yet believes p instead because 
of the interference of some desire, emotion or other motivational state favoring 
p. 
Self-deception is regarded a case of irrationality, and in extreme cases a 
pathology that impedes self-knowledge and it is subject to moral sanction. 
Indeed, this is partly the reason why it is paradoxical. On the one hand, self-
deception is a moral charge, which applies to something one does. On the 
other hand, it implies lack of the relevant sort of self-knowledge that the moral 
imputability and the applicability of moral sanctions imply. The moral 
implications of self-deception are to some important extent similar to 
(interpersonal cases of) deception. But there are some morally relevant aspects 
of the phenomenon that are absent in interpersonal deception. Arguably, (the 
charge of) deception implies intentionality, while (the charge of) self-deception 
does not. For this very reason, lying to oneself is more threatening than being 
lied to by others, since in the former case it becomes unclear how to protect 
oneself from deception. We ordinarily assume self-transparency, even though 
we know that there are large areas of our mental processes and operations that 
remain inaccessible. One solution is to treat self-deception as a case where our 
mind is opaque, as it happens for many mental sub-personal processes and 
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operations.1 But the interesting aspect of self-deception is that it concerns 
beliefs and mental states that are normally accessible. Hence, the selective 
character posits an obstacle to reducing self-deception to a general case of the 
opacity of the mind because it appears to exhibit some sort of finality. That is, it 
concerns a selected cluster of beliefs that whose knowledge the agent has an 
interest in blocking, even though she may not intend to block it.  
The question I would like to address is what kind of irrationality self-
deception represents, and what moral consequences it carries for the self-
deceptive agent. I will argue that self-deception is not merely a pathological 
phenomenon, but a defensive strategy that is functional to maintaining the 
stability of the self. As such, the phenomenon of self-deception can be 
evaluated under different dimensions of rationality. My starting point is to take 
self-deception as a practical rather than a theoretical phenomenon. Its 
philosophical relevance resides in the relation the agent bears to her reasons to 
believe, rather than in the issue of whether she accurately represents the world 
and her mind as independent objects. I speculate that self-deception is more 
similar to alienation than to interpersonal deception in this regard. In both 
cases, self-opacity undermines agential authority, that is, the authority that the 
agent claims on her action. In focusing on agential authority, I am driven by the 
conviction that the relevant source of interference in the production and 
formation process of self-deceptive beliefs is neither an intention to deceive 
nor a desire, but a concern with one’s self-representation. The constitutivist 
account I am proposing has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-
deception as well as its being subject to moral judgment and sanction. These 
are very important features of self-deception that elude traditional accounts of 
self-deception. The motivational explanation fails to fully capture them, and 
the intentionalist approach treats them inadequately and generates well-known 
paradoxes about how the agent holds intentionally contradictory beliefs. The 
proposal is to adopt a constitutivist account of self-knowledge, where agents 
are responsible for making up their mind, and they are also responsible for self-
deception. This is not because self-deception is analogous to deception in that 
it is brought about by the intention to deceive. Rather, it is because of the 
special relation (of authority) the agent bears to her own mind and agency. 
 
1 For a treatment of self-deception that relinquishes the claim about intentionality and say that it self-
deception is operated at subintentional level, see Johnston 1988. White (1988) discusses the case of 
self-deception as an argument for homuncular theories of identity.  
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Focus on the special responsibility that agents have for their own beliefs helps 
us see what is wrong with self-deception and why it can be evaluated morally. 
This practical account of self-deception has some important consequences 
about theories of self-knowledge. It belongs to a broadly constitutivist view 
that takes self-knowledge to be a practical rather than a theoretical matter. A 
canonical objection against the constitutivist approach to self-knowledge is 
that it makes the formation and retention of beliefs arbitrary, insofar as it holds 
that agents make up their mind. Clearly, self-deception would be impossible to 
describe in any voluntarist view of self-knowledge on which the agent simply 
decides at whim what to believe, without being subject to any constraint. 
Constitutivism avoids this problem of arbitrariness by arguing that the 
formation and retention of beliefs is indeed constrained, hence there are right 
and wrong ways of constituting beliefs. But constitutivists differ as to what the 
relevant constraints and their rationale are.2 The constitutivist account I 
defend attempts to separate the issue of stability from the issue of autonomy, 
which is crucial to genuine agential authority. It points out that stability and 
autonomy are both issues that can be evaluated rationally, but they call into play 
different dimensions of rationality. My argument is that while self-deception 
works as a pragmatic strategy to improve or guarantee the stability of the self, it 
nonetheless undermines its autonomy, hence its authority over action. The 
self-deceptive agent can even be more stable than the autonomous agent, but it 
loses authority on her actions. These are all matters of degrees, of course; and 
one interesting question concerns the scope of self-deception. I will argue that 
the selective and circumscribed nature of self-deception is crucial to its success 
as a pragmatic strategy for maintaining stability of the self, which is of limited 
sustainability.  
Furthermore, this argument has some bearing against those theories of 
agency that either take stability as a property of autonomous agents or take 
stability equivalent to autonomy. It reveals that the constitutivist views of 
agency, which hold that agents make up their mind in action, need to lay down 
some stricter criteria than stability for authorship on mental life. Such criteria 
 
2 Notably, the main difference concerns the nature of constraints. According to Kantians, such 
constraints are moral and necessary; for others, they are contingent and their nature is not moral. See 
Korsgaard 2008, Velleman 2009. 
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should include moral constraints about how to relate to self and others, and my 
suggestion is that they be grounded on respect. 3  
2. Self-Deception, Negligence, and Ignorance 
It is tempting to think of self-deception as a peculiar case of deception, as if 
deceiving oneself is analogous to deceiving others.4 Is not Amy lying to herself, 
after all? The analogy with deception helps us distinguish self-deception from 
mere error. The case of Amy who refuses to believe her daughter Bea to be 
anorexic, despite all the evidence to the contrary, is different from the case in 
which Greta fails to realize that her son Phil is a drug addict because she fails to 
recognize and properly collect the evidence, or because she ignores the 
symptoms of heroin addiction and thus she does not know what counts as 
evidence in this particular case. Greta may fail to collect the evidence or to 
adequately interpret the evidence through no faults of her own. Or, she may be 
utterly negligent. She may simply not care about the whereabouts of her son, 
and thus refrain from inquiring about his state of health. Or else she may 
voluntarily disengage from such investigations not out of negligence, but 
because she does not think it is right of her to intrude and interfere with her 
son’s life, even when his health and prospects are at stake. In these three 
scenarios, Greta may be holding false beliefs or lacking beliefs about the state 
of health of her son, but she is not self-deceptive. Self-deception is more 
similar to deception than to culpable and not culpable ignorance, or error, in 
this respect.  
The selectivity of self-deception is a very important aspect of it.5 Self-
deception concerns only a very specific set of beliefs. In this case, it is only 
about the mother’s beliefs about anorexia, rather than say all beliefs 
concerning the general state of health of Bea. It is not uncommon that the self-
deceptive agent is attentive to all signs but those that matter for the belief she 
resists. Amy may be quite perceptive of all other aspects of her daughter health, 
and worried about seasonal cold, while disregarding only the signs of anorexia. 
The analogy with interpersonal cases of deception helps us see that the self-
 
3 This suggestions shows that I tend to side with Kantian forms of constitutivism, but I will not argue 
directly for any Kantian claim in this paper.  
4 On the moral dimension of the similarity between deception and self-deception, see Baron 1988.  
5 On the so-called selectivity problem, see Bermúdez 1997, 2000.  
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deceptive agent is deceptive about some particular beliefs, even though she is 
largely reliable on all other matters. The scope of self-deception is very 
specific. A massive, global, and self-consistent delusion such as Don Quixote’s 
imaginary world is not self-deception. It requires no internal struggle, no split 
of the self, and no effort to reach unity. By contrast, the world is always about to 
intrude in the self-deceptive’s existence, and it threatens disaster. There is 
always a moment where mothers like Amy have to confront reality. Such 
moments are experienced rather differently than the acquisition of new 
shattering information about the world. They are likely to be experience of 
failures, as well as experiences of having failed others. A scenario where Amy 
eventually realizes that her daughter is anorexic differs significantly from the 
scenario where she suddenly learns that her daughter is affected by a life-
threatening disease.  
This asymmetry is often signaled in moral terms. The coming out of self-
deception is typically accompanied, or rather, partially constituted by emotions 
that are appropriate also in the case of moral failure.6 For instance, it is 
appropriate for Amy to feel guilty for having disregarded the evidence that 
pointed to Bea’s anorexia. Correspondingly, the self-deceptive agent is the 
target of moral judgments of condemnation or pity, and she is expected to feel 
guilty upon realization. Perhaps, the moral judgment addressed to the self-
deceptive agent is not as strongly negative as the one addressed to the liar, but 
it is certainly not positive. It is an open question whether the self-deceptive 
agent deserves to be blamed, and this partly depends on the conditions for 
being the appropriate target of moral judgment. But it seems largely agreed 
that the self-deceptive agent morally differs from the one faultlessly lacking 
relevant information. If the negligent is culpable, the self-deceptive agent is not 
completely innocent. When she is excused, it is because she is considered a 
pathological case, less than a fully morally competent agent.  
In the case of Amy, the relevant moral implication is that she failed Bea, that 
is, she failed to pay attention to and take care of her. These are also failures to 
value Bea as worthy of attention and care, or as I will show next, as failing to 
recognize Bea as legitimately claiming attention and care. Other cases of self-
 
6 I take the category of feelings of guilt to be rather inclusive, and not linked to intentionality. That is, 
such feelings are appropriate even when the agent did not intentionally cause any harm or violate any 
moral claims. 
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deception may not have direct victims as in this case, but there is always 
something morally objectionable involved. The question is what that is.  
3. Feelings of guilt, blame, and pity: the moral relevance of self-deception 
It is hard to pinpoint exactly the moral offense of which the self-deceptive agent 
is guilty. The case is not clear-cut as deception. The deceptive agent 
manipulates others in order to pursue her own interests or plans. Unlike the 
deceiver, it is not obvious that the self-deceptive agent intends to deceive 
herself to further her own interests or plans. In fact, this sounds paradoxical. 
What further plans and interests does the self-deceptive agent try to pursue 
despite herself? And how could she pursue some plans in the ignorance of what 
she herself knows? These are puzzling questions that arise because the analogy 
with deception leads to thinking of self-deception in terms of intentions. But 
the analogy can be taken to highlight aspects of self-deception other than its 
alleged intentionality.  
As I take it, the analogy points out that self-deception is a moral charge, 
associated to some kind of moral sanction. This association, however, does not 
imply that self-deception is a thoroughly intentional affair. In fact, moral 
reproach takes different forms whether it is directed to the deceiver or to the 
self-deceptive agent. It is morally appropriate to blame people who manipulate 
others in order to get what they want, while pity is a more appropriate moral 
attitude to address the self-deceptive agent. The moral grammar of feelings of 
guilt is compatible with the claim that self-deception is not fully intentionally 
deceptive; and so is the grammar of pity. Nonetheless, self-deception is a case 
of moral relevance. 
Here is the interesting asymmetry, though. In the case of deception, it is 
apparent who the victim of the moral crime is. In the case of self-deception, 
instead, things are not simple. The difficulty does not reside only in the fact 
that it is not obvious whether the self-deceptive agent is culpable of any moral 
crime, since it is questionable that she intends to deceive. Rather, the difficulty 
is that it is not clear how to describe the moral offence of the self-deceptive 
agent. I will argue that there is something morally objectionable about self-
deception, even when we put the issue of intentionality aside. There is some 
self-serving partiality involved in disregarding evidence selectively, which 
makes the self-deceptive agent look more like the liar than either the negligent 
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or the ignorant. The reluctance that motivates self-deception is self-concerned. 
But what does the self-deceptive agent promote, protect, or express? 
4. Self-deception as a Practical Phenomenon: a Normative Account 
Traditionally, self-deception is seen as an epistemic and theoretical case of 
irrationality: the self-deceptive agent holds contradictory beliefs about the 
world. On this description, the problem with Amy is that she believes that Bea 
is too thin and does not eat properly and she also believes that Bea is not 
anorexic, where these are two contradictory beliefs. The literature on self-
deception abounds with strategies to avoid such paradoxical condition (Rorty 
1988a, I-II). Countenance of incoherence can take different forms. For 
instance, some adopt a strategy of temporal partitioning (Bermúdez, 2000). 
Others, instead, favor the strategy of psychological division, where the self is 
partitioned into psychological parts that play the role of the deceiver and 
deceived respectively (Pears, 1984; Davidson, 1985; Rorty, 1988b).7  
In contrast to these interpretations, I suggest that we describe the case of 
Amy more like a case where the agent does not take the available evidence to 
count as reasons. This description points to a different aspect of Amy’s activity 
of belief formation. Amy’s problem is not that she holds contradictory beliefs, 
but that she has reason to believe something that she does not in fact believe. 
Why? The selective nature of self-deception and the analogy with deception 
discussed above naturally invite us to find answers by investigating further aims 
of the agent. What does the self-deceptive agent want? What does she try to 
obtain by lying to herself? Motivationalists respond to these questions by 
invoking an interfering desire, and treat self-deception as a case of desire-
biased belief (Mele, 2001; Nelkin, 2002; Funkhouser, 2005). It is because 
Amy does not want to be the case that Bea is anorexic. An interesting and 
illuminating suggestion is that the interfering desire may be not concerned 
with some state of affairs (a world in which Bea is anorexic), but a self-focused 
desire (Funkhouser, 2005).8 What is interesting about this suggestion is that 
it connects the bias involved in self-deception to the self.  
 
7 Among the strategies that for avoiding these paradoxes, there are more moderate views about how to 
draw the division within the self, such as Pears 1984, 1986, 1991, and Davidson 1982, 1985. 
8 Funkhouser (2005) accepts motivationalism, but he interestingly distinguishes between self-focused 
and world-focused desires, and defends the former account versus the latter. 
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To further develop this suggestion, however, we need to abandon the talk 
of desires. I propose a normative model, where the interfering force is neither 
desire nor an emotion, but a broad normative concern with the agent’s own 
self-representation. I contend that this concern is not reducible to second-
order desires about the selves, but it involves appeal to normative ideals of 
agency, to which the agent holds herself accountable. In the interesting cases 
of self-deception, this normative concern plays a role in blocking the normative 
value and weight of beliefs about the agent’s not being up to such standards. 
That is, the self-deceptive agent defends herself against the charge of not being 
up to her own standards of agency, by blocking the normative force of reasons 
that support such a judgment. For instance, self-deceptive Amy bracketed or 
suspended the normative power of reasons for believing that Bea is anorexic. 
Amy’s resistance to form the belief that Bea is anorexic has certainly to do with 
her desire that Bea be healthy, and with her emotional discomfort of 
confronting a world where the child is sick, but it has also some more profound 
connections to how Amy thinks of herself in relation Bea. She knows that Bea is 
too thin and shows worrisome eating habits, but these considerations have 
little normative weight in her overall epistemic system. The point is not that the 
Amy does not access her most intimate thoughts, or that she misses strong 
evidence about some states of affairs, and thus forms false beliefs or disbelieves 
what is true. Rather, the key philosophical point in self-deception is that the 
self-deceptive agent does not take the evidence available to her as reasons. I 
want to argue that this is a practical mistake, not a theoretical one. 
The (practical) problem of how Amy forms her self-deceptive beliefs does 
not get resolved by endorsing some coherence-driven strategies. More 
importantly, it is a problem that only Amy can resolve by engaging in practical 
reflection. In contrast to theoretical reflection about how the world is, practical 
reflection is driven by the agent’s practical concerns. It does not aim at 
establishing the truth about the world, even though it is constrained by 
concerns of accuracy and truthfulness. Its purpose is for the agent to determine 
what she has reason to believe, and this is something that pertains to the 
context of deliberation.  
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Here I am invoking a distinction that stands in the background of 
constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge. Richard Moran has thus formulated 
the distinction:  
Roughly, a theoretical question is one that is answered by discovery of the fact 
about oneself of which one was ignorant, whereas a practical question is 
answered by a decision, and does not arise from ignorance of some antecedent 
fact about oneself. (Moran, 1988, p. 141).  
Accordingly, what it takes to Amy to realize that Bea is anorexic is not some 
new information about the state of the world, but a change in her practical 
attitude toward the evidence she already has about Bea. The change is 
prompted by practical reflection, which does not aim at accuracy in the 
representation of the world, but it is itself productive of such representations, 
and driven by a practical concern about what to believe about the world.  
To treat self-deception as a practical rather than theoretical issue is not to 
discount the fact that it is an epistemic condition. Self-deception raises issues 
about knowledge of oneself. But to capture its philosophical import we should 
focus on the special relation that the agent bears to her own states of mind. 
That relation is of authorship. This is the basic claim of constitutivist accounts 
of self-knowledge. In such accounts, the agent is responsible for what she 
believes. Hence, she is also responsible for her self-deception. The agent 
engaged in self-knowledge does not discover some truths about herself 
through the course of an introspective theoretical investigation; rather, she 
engages in deliberative activities that are productive of epistemic states.  
The epistemic stories that agents elaborate in deliberation are not 
epistemic stories about themselves as independent objects of knowledge. Such 
stories are constitutive of self-knowledge. Claiming authorship for what the 
agent believes of herself is to take responsibility for herself as an agent. 
Because of its focus on the responsibility for belief, the constitutivist account 
seems suitable to make sense of two important aspects of self-deception: its 
selective nature and its moral status. The self-deceptive agent is entitled to feel 
guilty because she is responsible for her self-deceptive condition. That she is 
responsible for her beliefs also explains why self-deception is never global or 
random, but it concerns some beliefs that bear a particular relevance for the 
self.  
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5. Self-Deception as a Pragmatic Strategy 
It may seem that by making the agent responsible for belief formation the 
constitutivist account actually dissolves the very problem of self-deception. If it 
is up to the agent what to believe, how can one discriminate between genuine 
cases of self-knowledge and self-deception? This is a special case of a general 
objection against constitutivist views of self-knowledge, which is based on 
some misunderstanding. Constitutivism does not claim that the agent simply 
decides what to believe. The claim is not intended to be causal. It is not that the 
agent brings self-deception about insofar as she decides what to believe. To 
this extent, the intentionality of the belief is not the relevant philosophical 
issue. On the constitutivist view, agents are self-interpreting animals. What to 
believe is something they determine in the first-person, as part of the activities 
by which they take responsibility for themselves. While belief formation is a 
practical matter, there are, indeed, norms that constrain and guide its 
processes.  
According to Richard Moran, for instance, such process should respond to 
criteria of theoretical transparency. One should make up one’s mind about p 
on the basis of reasons related to the truth or falsity of p. The criteria of 
theoretical transparency constrain also the formation of attitudes and emotions 
of fear and love.9 It is exactly because such constrains hold that we can 
rationally assess believes, emotions, and attitudes. When such criteria are 
violated, then the agent makes up her mind for the sake of reasons that are 
merely pragmatic. It seems plausible to treat self-deception as a case where 
pragmatic reasons prevail, and the agent comes to form and retain beliefs for 
reasons that are not constrained by criteria of theoretical transparency.  
It may seem that self-deception still counts as a case of theoretical 
irrationality, under this description. My point here is that self-deception is a 
complex phenomenon and should be assessed according to different 
dimension of rationality. It is easy to fill in a story where Amy holds very strong 
pragmatic reasons to discount the evidence she has that her daughter is 
 
9 «One answers the question of whether to feel hopeful or ashamed by determining whether 
something is actually hopeful or shameful. Similarly, a practical question about what I want will often 
be transparent to an impersonal theoretical question about what is good, desirable or useful. It is 
essential to the rationality of belief that practical questions about it should be transparent in this way» 
(Moran, 1988, p. 145).  
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anorexic. Understandably, this is no welcome news. It is normal for parents to 
think of their kids as safe and perfect, and to resist evidence about their 
vulnerability. Moreover, suppose that medical research relates anorexia to 
some deep emotional instability of the anorexic, due to problematic family 
relations. Perhaps, Amy does not want to confront the possibility that what she 
represents as a loving nest is not sufficient for Bea’s needs. The belief that Bea 
is anorexic brings along a judgment about herself as a failing mother. To 
confront this possibility would seriously undermine Amy’s own emotional 
stability. Perhaps Amy lives in a very traditional household where women feel 
guilty for having a career, even when they do take care of their family, etc. 
When we take into account the broad deliberative context where self-deceptive 
beliefs belong, their irrationality is less apparent. Given the full story, it is 
rational for Amy to discount the belief that Bea is anorexic, because this belief 
threatens the image she has of herself, and it would undermine her emotional 
stability. For Amy’s own sake, it is preferable to suspend the normative force of 
the evidence that leads to that belief. It is a rational strategy of defense. What it 
is threatened is not some particular interest or value that are dear to the agent, 
but her own understanding of her self. Unlike the liar, the self-deceptive agent 
does not try to pursue a specific interest or promote an interest. She seems 
engaged in a much broader and worrisome enterprise. Still, we can recognize 
some continuity, which can be captured in terms of instrumental or strategic 
rationality. Self-deception is instrumental to the stability of her self, and to this 
extent it is a rational strategy. This means that self-deception is not a totally 
pathological phenomenon. Indeed, its basic processes are continuous with 
other rational epistemic strategies that underlie correct processes of belief 
formation. Self-deception is a phenomenon typical and distinctive of animals 
that hold ideals and representations of themselves. It is because we are self-
reflective animals capable of designing representations of ourselves that we are 
liable to self-deception.10 The self-deceptive agent is concerned with the 
 
10 On this aspect see Darwall 1988. To the extent that self-deception requires self-reflection, I agree 
with Brown (2004) when she holds that the activity of self-emplotment is partially constitutive of self-
knowledge and self-deception. But I strongly disagree with Brown’s claim that self-deception is a 
positive epistemic state, for reasons I offer in the text. I have defended a narrative conception of 
practical identity in Bagnoli 2007. Cf. Holton for a completely different account that takes mistakes 
about the self to be a necessary condition for self-deception. 
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coherence and stability of her emotional and epistemic system as any rational 
agent would be. This is what she is trying to protect. Is she successful?  
Debates about this latter question admit only of positive and negative 
answers. Mele (2001, p. 50) and Nelkin (2002, p. 394) think she is successful 
in coming to believe as she desires; Funkhouser (2003) thinks she is not. But 
if I am right to say that self-deception is continuous with normal rational 
epistemic strategies, the answer should be addressed in a broader context and 
admit of qualifications.  
Baljinder and Thagard (2003) propose that self-deception results from the 
emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. I think Baljinder & 
Taghard are right that the self-deceived agent is concerned with improving the 
emotional coherence of her overall epistemic and deliberative set (beliefs, 
emotions, and subjective goals). However, this pragmatic strategy is successful 
only to the extent that it is limited and circumscribed. As a pragmatic strategy 
to maintain emotional stability and coherence, self-deception is rather limited, 
and it is important to notice how. First, its success crucially depends on its 
selective nature. It works only if it is a circumscribed phenomenon. Secondly, 
because it needs to be so circumscribed, its advantage cannot but be 
temporary. Typically, as a pragmatic strategy, self-deception comes to an end. 
Third, when it comes to an end, the self-deceptive agent realizes that stability 
based on purely pragmatic reasons is not enough, because it fails to afford 
agential authority, which is necessary to self-knowledge and autonomous 
agency.11  
Self-deception is a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self-
knowledge as well as of autonomous agency. The notion of authorship as the 
capacity to endorse a thought as one’s own and justify it on the basis of reasons. 
Reasons are considerations that make an act intelligible and justifiable. More 
importantly in this context, reasons convey the relation of authorship. They 
express a relation between the agent and the action, such that the action can be 
imputable to the agent as hers. Justifying an action or a belief on the basis of a 
reason is thus authorizing it and also claiming authorship on it. Hence, actions 
and beliefs are expressive of one’s agency insofar as they are supported by 
reasons. It is crucial for us that we act and think on the basis of reasons, 
 
11 That the success of this strategy crucially depends on the limitation of scope is an interesting aspect 
that makes self-deception similar to deception. The systematic liar is self-defeating as much as the 
global self-deceiver. After all, Kant was right. 
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because this is the way we exercise our agency on the world. The threat to our 
authorship can be more or less tragic and disruptive, depending on the nature 
of the claims at stake and their relation to our selves. The significance of self-
deception varies correspondingly.  
6. The Moral Problem of Self-Deception 
Self-reflective agents exert a special kind of authority on their mental life. This 
kind of authority is fundamentally first-personal and, under this reading, it is 
conceptually linked to (or even identified with) autonomy. Self-deception, I 
argued, is a pragmatic or defensive strategy for maintaining the stability of the 
self. Its success is limited, and its costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by 
undermining the authority she has on her mental life. To this extent, self-
deception is more akin to alienation and estrangement, and in this final section 
I propose that we dwell on this similarity in order to appreciate it morally 
problematic dimension.  
According to constitutivist views of agency, the moral person assumes 
responsibility for herself by regulating her life by her own best judgment. 
Moral integrity thus amounts to a form of self-government. Rational agents are 
responsible for the constitution of such self-government. But there are rather 
different views about how to conceive of self-government. Contemporary 
accounts of self-government tend to be rather minimalist in terms of the 
requirement for full authorship and rational self-government.12 For instance, 
in his early work, Harry Frankfurt suggested that the upshot of practical 
reflection aiming at self-government is a «radical separation of the competing 
desires, one of which is not merely assigned a relatively less favored position, 
but extruded entirely as an outlaw» (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 170).13 The aim of 
this strategy is not so much to resolve the conflict by annulling one desire as to 
produce a ―well-ordered self‖ by removing the internal obstacle. Interestingly, 
this aim is achieved by altering the nature of the conflict: once one of the 
conflicting desires is disavowed, there would be no internal division. Disavowal 
is a way of disowning some mental state as external, and thus distancing and 
dissociating oneself from it. Hence, disavowal is not simply a disclaimer; it’s an 
act of choice determining withdrawal of ownership and authorship. The aim of 
 
12 I borrow this characterization from O’Neill 2004, pp. 13-26. 
13 See also Frankfurt 1988 (pp. 63, 66-67), 2001 (p. 11), 1988 (p. 172), 1999 (p. 136). 
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self-deception is analogous to the operations of the self that Frankfurt 
describes as distinctive of autonomous agency. This means that self-deception 
is more akin to other normal rational activities of the self. But it also indicates 
that to make sense of its aberration we need to provide stricter constraints than 
those Frankfurt adopts. 
My (Kantian) proposal is to adopt universal criteria of rational scrutiny of 
reasons.14 In forming beliefs, adopting attitudes, and take responsibility for 
ourselves as agent, we should rely on considerations that could be shared by all 
other rational agents. It is possible to construct such reasons and take them as 
authoritative if we take ourselves as members of a community of agents with 
equal standing, governed by norms of mutual respect and recognition. 
Recognizably, this is a Kantian requirement of practical rationality.15 It 
requires that our judgments and actions be intelligible and justified to all 
relevant others. Insofar as they have equal standing, others are entitled to ask 
for reasons and accept the burden of offering reasons to us. This is to say that 
they stand in a relation of mutual recognition with us. While self-knowledge 
and self-constitution are fundamentally first-personal, they always implicate a 
broader context of shared norms. Of course, I will not be able to argue directly 
for this claim. The purpose of these final remarks is merely to point out that in 
order to distinguish self-deception from other rational epistemic strategies, we 
need some basic moral criteria. Appeal to universal norms of shared rationality 
explains what is morally wrong with self-deception. The self-deceptive agent 
does not critically review the considerations that count in favor of beliefs on the 
basis of shared norms. In order to protect her stability she relies on less 
demanding constraints.  
The morally disturbing feature of self-deception is its partiality.16 First, it 
undermines agential autonomy. Out of fear and concern for herself, Amy 
settles on standards of justification that are lower than any rational agent would 
adopt, and thus loses grip on her agency. She thereby trades off her autonomy 
for a limited security and comfort. But she puts herself in no safer place. As we 
 
14 I develop this view in Bagnoli 2007a, 2007b. See also O’Neill 1985, 2004. 
15 «The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as giving universal law through 
all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a 
very fruitful concept dependent upon it, namely that of the kingdom of ends» (Kant, 1785/1996, p. 
83. 
16 For a different characterization of what it is wrong with self-deception, see Darwall 1988, Baron 
1988. 
114 Humana.Mente — Issue 20 — Febraury 2012 
 
saw, her pragmatic strategy requires that she be insulated from the world, and 
this is not possible in the long run. The self-deceptive agent routinely fails 
herself. Secondly, she fails others. Her partial concern with her safety makes 
victims. As a result of Amy’s self-deception, Bea’s desperate call for help is not 
heard. It may be objected that this happens only in some special harmful cases 
of self-deception, and it cannot be generalized. But the point is that the self-
deceptive agent is inclined to discount reasons that concern others, when such 
reasons are threatening for herself. It is against this possibility that moral 
criteria are put forward. Our ordinary epistemic life abounds with small-scale 
cases of self-deception, and it may seem excessive moral zealousness to treat 
them as signs of moral failures. The Kantian requirement is not there for the 
moral fanatic to express her harsh disapproval, but for the reflective agent to 
prevent that such apparently innocent cases make casualties.  
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